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REGIONALIZING LABOR POLICY 
THROUGH NAFTA: BEYOND PRESIDENT 
BUSH’S TEMPORARY WORKER PROPOSAL 
Elizabeth L. Gunn*
Abstract: The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) sought to 
create an expanded and secure market for the goods and services 
produced in its member territories. It represented huge improvements in 
the freedom of goods, services, and investments to move between member 
nations, but remained silent on the issue of freedom of movement of 
labor. The major objection to unrestricted movement of labor within 
NAFTA was the concern of permanent immigration from Mexico into, 
mainly, the United States. In early 2004, President George W. Bush 
introduced a proposal to allow, unilaterally, freer movement of temporary 
laborers into the United States. This Note argues that the President’s 
proposal is ºawed because it fails to seek a multilateral agreement for the 
freedom of movement beyond that which ºows into the United States, and 
especially ignores U.S. citizens seeking employment abroad. Rather than 
the United States acting unilaterally, this Note argues for a re-considera-
tion of movement of labor within NAFTA. 
Introduction 
 In the Winter of 1992, during the height of negotiations for the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United States 
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
commented that “if immigration is not formally on the table, some-
one at the table will sooner or later realize as a practical matter that 
moving goods and services in international commerce also involves 
moving the people who trade in those goods and services.”1 The 
Commissioner’s connection between the free movement of capital 
(goods and services) and that of labor is a key concept in the theory 
of economic efªciency, which calls for the unrestricted movement of 
                                                                                                                      
* Elizabeth L. Gunn is the Solicitations & Symposium Editor of the Boston College Inter-
national & Comparative Law Review. 
1 Noemi Gal-Or, Labor Mobility Under NAFTA: Regulatory Policy Spearheading the Social 
Supplement to the International Trade Regime, 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 365, 365 (1998). 
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capital and labor to where its marginal output would be the highest.2 
Discussions of free movement of labor, however, inevitably are accom-
panied by concerns of permanent immigration and the resulting det-
rimental effects on the native labor force.3 Because of the high levels 
of illegal immigrants passing from Mexico into the United States, 
both the migration and immigration of workers have become increas-
ingly contentious political issues in the United States.4
 In January 2004, the debate about immigration again came to the 
political forefront in the United States when President George W. 
Bush outlined his new proposal for a restructured temporary worker 
program.5 The plan, as proposed, would allow employers to hire will-
ing foreign workers to ªll jobs when no willing U.S. worker could be 
found, and would give those workers temporary legal status for three 
years.6 Depending on its ultimate scope, the program would restruc-
ture, if not replace, the current H-2 visas for non-immigrant unskilled 
workers.7 The President’s plan would open up U.S. immigration pol-
icy with respect to unskilled workers, as opposed to the current status 
of U.S. law with respect to restricted temporary entry of business per-
son provisions under NAFTA.8 Upon the expiration of the three-year 
period, workers would be allowed to ªle for a renewal of their status, 
but the program would be required to have “an end” and would not 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains from the Lib-
eralized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 371, 373 (1998). 
3 See Jason C. Messenger, Comment, Opening the U.S.-Mexico Border: Problems and Con-
cerns for the Bush Administration, the Countries, and the Legal System to Consider, 9 Tulsa J. 
Comp. & Int’l L. 607, 619 (2002). 
4 Philip L. Martin, Economic Integration and Migration: The Case of NAFTA, 3 UCLA J. 
Int’l L. & Foreign Aff. 419, 421 (1998). 
5 See President Bush Announces Immigration Initiative, 81 No. 2 Interpreter Releases 33, 
33 (2004) [hereinafter Bush Announcement]. 
6 Id. at 33–34. 
7 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (2003). H-2 visas require that an employer has at-
tempted to hire U.S. nationals by offering the prevailing wage and has failed before hiring 
the foreign workers, but it provides no legal status for those workers nor does it provide a 
central system to assist employers in the search for U.S. workers. Id. Additionally, there is a 
limit on the number of temporary workers allowed under the current law. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(8)(i)(C) (2003). 
8 See Harry J. Joe, Immigration and Labor, in NAFTA and Beyond: A New Framework 
for Doing Business in the Americas, 421, 428–29 ( Joseph J. Norton & Thomas L. 
Bloodworth eds., 1995). The four classes of business persons allowed temporary entry 
under NAFTA are business visitors, traders and investors, intra-company transferees, and 
professionals. Id. See generally Michael D. Patrick, Possible New Options for Skilled Foreign Profes-
sionals, 231 N.Y.L.J. 3 ( 2004) (implying that, though the main benefactors of the Presi-
dent’s plan will be unskilled workers, the plan also could lead to beneªts for skilled profes-
sionals over the current law which sets a cap on the number of available visas). 
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provide any advantage to temporary workers with respect to pursuing 
U.S. citizenship.9 The President stressed that one of the expectations 
and goals of the program is for temporary workers to return perma-
nently to their country of origin.10
 This Note explores the social, political, and economic 
justiªcations presented in favor of the President’s initiative. 
Speciªcally, this Note addresses how temporary workers ªt within the 
theory of economic efªciency, NAFTA, and the long term considera-
tion of immigration. While President Bush’s initiative is applicable to 
temporary workers from any nation, this Note focuses on the issue of 
immigration between the United States and Mexico. Part I discusses 
the treatment of capital and labor within NAFTA, the speciªcs of 
President Bush’s initiative, and presents statistics about immigration 
between the United States and Mexico. Part II examines the direct 
and indirect economic and social effects immigration has on native 
workers and seeks to explain the phenomenon that temporary worker 
programs tend to end in permanent dependence and immigration. 
Part III argues that, based on the President’s stated goals of the tem-
porary worker program, the plan creates negative effects on foreign 
workers because of its limited time and scope. Further, it asserts that, 
rather than a unilateral change in immigration policy by the United 
States, the issue of movement of labor and immigration should be 
considered as a new NAFTA provision so as to complete the agree-
ment’s treatment of free trade within the region. 
I. Labor Treatment in NAFTA, the Bush Initiative, and 
Immigration into the United States 
 One of the prime motivating factors for the United States to enter 
into NAFTA was to help ensure an economically strong Mexico.11 How-
ever, the debate surrounding the ratiªcation of the trade agreement 
went beyond the economic factors included in its language to include 
heated and highly public debates about labor and the environment.12 
One such debate concerned the issue of Mexican immigrants and their 
effect on the U.S. job market.13 President Bush’s proposal again 
                                                                                                                      
9 See Bush Announcement, supra note 5, at 33. 
10 Id. at 34. 
11 See Sylvia Ostry, The NAFTA: Its International Economic Background, in North America 
Without Borders? 21, 27 (Stephen J. Randall ed., 1992). 
12 See Joe, supra note 8, at 450. 
13 See id. (characterizing organized labor’s lobbying of Congress as intensive and ex-
tremely vocal). 
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brought Mexican immigration to the forefront, this time in the context 
of amending the United States’ immigration policy and law.14
A. NAFTA, a Trade Agreement Not a Social Contract 
 This section explores how labor and immigration, despite the 
fact that they were not primary considerations in the NAFTA negotia-
tions, were brought to the forefront of the NAFTA debate within the 
United States. The Preamble to NAFTA states, in part, that the mem-
ber nations resolve to “create an expanded and secure market for the 
goods and services produced in their territories” and “protect, en-
hance and enforce basic workers’ rights.”15 NAFTA signiªcantly en-
hanced the scope of trade in goods, services, and investment between 
its member nations, but it remained silent as to the free movement of 
labor, or, in other words, the rights of workers to seek employment in 
other member nations.16
 Under NAFTA, all goods that meet the required rules of origin 
standards will have their tariffs eliminated between the member na-
tions by 2008 at the latest, allowing for the unrestricted trade of 
goods.17 NAFTA also provides common rules for investment between 
its members, liberalized restrictions on foreign investment, and a dis-
pute resolution mechanism for investors and other governments.18 In 
addition, NAFTA was one of the ªrst international treaties to include 
provisions on trade of services, and it established a set of rules and 
obligations that facilitate trade in services among the member na-
tions.19 The provisions relating to services include Chapter 12, which 
applies to cross-border trade in services, and Chapter 16, which estab-
lishes the mechanisms for temporary entry of business persons into 
member states.20
                                                                                                                      
14 See Maureen Minehan, Bush’s Temporary Worker Proposal Gives Employers Central Immi-
gration Role, 21 No. 5 Emp. Alert 3 (2004) (quoting the executive director of the National 
Immigration Forum Frank Sharry who claimed the President’s announcement “re-started 
a long overdue discussion of immigration reform”). 
15 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., pmbl., 32 
I.L.M. 269, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/legal/index_e.aspx?Cat 
egoryID=42 (index page for full NAFTA text) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
16 See Barry Appleton, Navigating NAFTA: A Concise User’s Guide to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement 4 (1994); Gal-Or, supra note 1, at 373–74. 
17 See Appleton, supra note 16, at 25. In order to qualify, goods must originate in 
North America if they are wholly North American. See id. Goods containing non-regional 
materials qualify if those materials are sufªciently transformed in the NAFTA region. See id. 
18 Id. at 79. 
19 Id. at 91. 
20 NAFTA, supra note 15, ch. 12, 16. 
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 With respect to movement of labor, beyond the statement in the 
Preamble, no provision of NAFTA directly addresses labor issues.21 In 
fact, Chapter 16 emphasizes the fact that NAFTA only covers tempo-
rary entry of business-people into member nations, stating “this Chap-
ter reºects . . . the need to ensure border security and to protect the 
domestic labor force and permanent employment in [the] respective 
territories.”22 Additionally, there is no authority or obligation on the 
part of any country to grant a citizen of any other country entry for 
the purpose of permanent residence.23 NAFTA speciªcally allows for 
member nations to maintain their individual immigration laws.24
 Movement of labor, and thus immigration, was not brought to 
the NAFTA negotiation table by the United States government; in 
fact, it was deliberately excluded.25 During negotiation and 
ratiªcation of the treaty, debate over immigration occurred mostly in 
the public arena.26 Two major schools of thought emerged.27 Econo-
mists and business interests asserted that NAFTA would be economi-
cally beneªcial for all nations involved.28 They stressed both the 
beneªts to economic efªciency within the region and individual 
member economic growth, which would lead to the creation of jobs 
in all member nations, especially Mexico.29 Organized labor and oth-
ers, including Ross Perot, claimed that NAFTA would encourage em-
ployers to ºee to Mexico for lower wage rates, and therefore, cost U.S. 
workers their jobs.30 Additionally, the issues of Mexican labor condi-
tions, environmental concerns, and illegal immigrants permeated and 
further fueled an already heated political debate.31
 Interestingly, it was not during the negotiations to formulate the 
provisions of NAFTA, but during the debates for ratiªcation, that in-
terest groups began to link immigration and migration issues with 
                                                                                                                      
21 Gal-Or, supra note 1, at 372. 
22 NAFTA, supra note 15, ch. 16, art. 1601. 
23 Joe, supra note 8, at 428. 
24 NAFTA, supra note 15, art. 1607 (stating that, except as speciªcally provided in the 
agreement, no provision of NAFTA shall impose any obligation on a member nation re-
garding its immigration measures). 
25 See Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican Immigration to 
the United States, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 937, 940 (1994); Gal-Or, supra note 1, at 373. 
26 See Johnson, supra note 25, at 950–53. 
27 See id. at 939. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. at 939, 951. 
30 See id. at 939. 
31 See Gal-Or, supra note 1, at 372–73. 
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ratiªcation of the treaty.32 It was increasing pressure from interest 
groups that caused immigration to become a crucial factor during the 
domestic debate surrounding NAFTA.33
 The issues raised by the NAFTA negotiations also became a major 
focus in the 1992 presidential election.34 After the election, public 
debate continued even after the signing of NAFTA.35 The issues sur-
rounding the threats of illegal immigration gained even more atten-
tion due to events such as the plight of the Haitian boat people and 
the passing of California Proposition 187 in 1994.36 As the Clinton 
Administration progressed, however, the public and governmental 
debates about the viability of free movement of labor between NAFTA 
member states faded and other issues took center stage.37
B. New Debate on Immigration: President Bush’s Temporary Worker Plan 
 When announcing his immigration initiative, President Bush 
pointed out that immigration reform must begin by confronting “a 
basic fact of life and economics” with respect to labor—some jobs be-
ing created in the United States are not being ªlled by U.S. citizens.38 
On January 7, 2003, the President proposed a new and reformed 
temporary worker program to “match willing foreign workers with 
willing U.S. employers when no U.S. citizen can be found to ªll the 
jobs.”39 Two of the reasons cited by the President for his revival of the 
debate surrounding immigration reform include, ªrst, that the new 
program would increase national security because there would be bet-
ter accounting of those who enter the country; and second, that the 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Johnson, supra note 25, at 941. 
33 Gal-Or, supra note 1, at 373. 
34 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Its Major 
Provisions, Economic Beneªts, and Overarching Implications, in The North American Free 
Trade Agreement: A New Frontier in International Trade and Investment in the 
Americas 1, 4 ( Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1994); see Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Labor and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, 11 Dick. J. Int’l L. 565, 575–76 (1993). 
35 See Christopher J. Cassise, Note, The European Union v. The United States Under the 
NAFTA: A Comparative Analysis of the Free Movement of Persons Within the Regions, 46 Syracuse 
L. Rev. 1343, 1374–75 (1996). 
36 See id. Proposition 187 bars undocumented aliens from receiving social services. See 
id. 
37 See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Clintoniªcation of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and 
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 731 (1997) (examining President Clinton’s 
effect on the law and liberal constitutional theory as related to the issues of abortion and 
welfare rights in America). 
38 Bush Announcement, supra note 5, at 33–34. 
39 Id. at 33. 
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program may aid in the long-term expansion of economic opportu-
nity between NAFTA members, which in theory would decrease illegal 
immigration into the United States.40
 Under the President’s proposed plan, temporary foreign workers 
would be granted legal status in the United States for three years, de-
pendent upon maintenance of their employment status, and, upon 
the expiration of their status, they have to apply for renewal or return 
to their home country permanently.41 The President stressed that the 
program would not change permanent immigration standards, retain-
ing the requirement that workers pursue permanent legal status 
through traditional legal immigration procedures.42 However, while 
the President asserted that the plan is the best long-term way to re-
duce the pressures that create illegal immigration,43 participants in 
the temporary worker program would not receive an advantage in 
their applications for U.S. citizenship.44 The President was explicitly 
clear that he opposes amnesty and would not place undocumented 
workers on the “automatic path to citizenship,” regardless of whether 
they subsequently entered the temporary worker program.45 Fur-
thermore, to give temporary workers an incentive to return home, the 
President said he would work with other countries to give temporary 
workers credit in their home country’s retirement system for their 
time worked in the United States.46 Finally, the President called for 
Congress to work with him to increase the annual number of green 
cards issued and to speed up the current citizenship process.47
 Consistent with the President’s policy on amnesty, unamended, the 
proposed temporary worker program would be open only to those ille-
gal aliens within the United States who had jobs on the day of his Janu-
ary announcement.48 In other words, any illegal alien entering the 
United States, or unemployed on the date of the announcement, would 
be excluded from eligibility.49 Eligible undocumented aliens in the 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. at 34. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 President Suspends Entry of Persons Engaged in or Beneªting from Corruption as President 
Fox Endorses Proposed Temporary Worker Program, 81 No. 3 Interpreter Releases 81, 81 
(2004) [hereinafter Fox Endorsement]. 
44 Bush Announcement, supra note 5, at 34. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Bush, Fox Emphasize Cooperation in News Conference, Wichita Eagle, Mar. 7, 2004, at 1, 
available at 2004 WL 68816412 [hereinafter Bush-Fox News Conference]. 
49 See id. 
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United States would be required to pay a one-time registration fee as a 
condition of participation.50 Potential participants residing outside the 
United States before entering the program would not be required to 
pay a fee due to their implied compliance with U.S. immigration laws.51 
Illegal immigrants entering the country after January 7, 2004 would be 
ineligible to enroll in the program from within the United States.52 All 
other provisions of the proposal would apply to every worker entering 
the program regardless of their original point of origin.53
 The development of the speciªc language of the proposed pro-
gram has been left to Congress, which, as of November 2004, has yet 
to fully consider the issue.54 The closest legislation to the issue was 
Senate Bill S. 2010, proposed in January 2004 and sponsored by then 
Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD) and Senator Chuck 
Hagel (R-NE), which proposed a more comprehensive approach to 
immigration reform, including reforms to the current foreign worker 
program.55 The main difference between the President’s plan and S. 
2010 is the proposal for the creation of an earned adjustment proc-
ess.56 Despite the lack of speciªc details and ultimate viability of the 
program,57 many immigration scholars felt that the President’s an-
nouncement was beneªcial because it jump-started discussion and 
debate surrounding immigration reform.58 As the 2004 presidential 
campaign progressed, however, the issue again lost momentum and 
ultimately was not a prominent feature in the 2004 campaign.59
                                                                                                                      
50 See Bush Announcement, supra note 5, at 34. 
51 See id. 
52 See Bush-Fox News Conference, supra note 48. 
53 See Bush Announcement, supra note 5, at 34. 
54 See Rhonda McMillion, Congress and the ABA Tackle President Bush’s Temporary Worker Plan, 
90 A.B.A. J. 68, 68 (2004); Bush, Fox Talk Immigration Reform, Cnn.com, Nov. 21, 2004, available 
at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/Americas/11/21/apec.ap/index.html [hereinafter 
Immigration Reform]. 
55 See McMillion, supra note 54, at 68. 
56 Patrick, supra note 8. An earned adjustment process allows qualifying workers auto-
matically to become eligible to apply for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resi-
dents. Id. 
57 See Kelly Patricia O’Meara, Do Borders Matter to President Bush?, Insight on the News 
30 (Feb. 20, 2004), available at http://www.insightmag.com/news/2004/03/02/National/ 
Do.Borders.Matter.To.President.Bush-607367.shtml (claiming the President’s immigration 
proposal likely will ªnd its way to oblivion). 
58 See Minehan, supra note 14; U.S. & Mexico: Immigration Policy & The Bilateral Relation-
ship: Hearing Before the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of Dr. 
Demetrios G. Papademetriou, President, Migration Policy Institute), at http://foreign. 
senate.gov/testimony/2004/PapademetriouTestimony040323.pdf  [hereinafter Papademetriou 
Testimony]. 
59 See Immigration Reform, supra note 54. 
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C. Issues and Statistics Surrounding the Movement of Labor Between the 
United States and Mexico 
 Immigration accounts for almost forty percent of the United 
States’ population growth,60 and sixty percent of the 500 million aliens 
whom the Department of Homeland Security admits to the United 
States each year pass across the border between the United States and 
Mexico.61 At the same time, virtually all Mexican emigrants head for 
the United States.62 Beyond a claim of loss of U.S. jobs to foreigners, 
there are a number of other potential internal and external effects on 
the labor market and the economy that can be associated with freer 
movement of labor between the United States and Mexico.63 Immigra-
tion affects everything from wage rates and job availability to the de-
mand for housing, education, and social services.64 Furthermore, im-
migration has an economic impact that goes beyond those with whom 
immigrants compete for jobs.65 Additionally, immigrants can directly 
affect politics at all levels, especially presidential elections.66
 Despite the problem of illegal immigration, social, economic, and 
political forces within the United States have been set to maintain the 
current immigration laws.67 Some scholars question if liberalization of 
the United States’ laws would improve the wages and conditions of mi-
grant and immigrant workers.68 The maintenance of the status quo 
does not address the issue that most Mexican immigrants, legal and 
illegal, leave their home country due to social and economic forces and 
“go north for opportunity” with the hope of a better life.69 One of the 
goals under NAFTA was to stimulate the Mexican economy’s growth, a 
policy theorized, and also recently supported by President Bush, as a 
                                                                                                                      
60 Peter H. Schuck, Immigration at the Turn of the Century, 33 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 1, 
3 (2001). 
61 U.S. & Mexico: Immigration Policy & The Bilateral Relationship: Hearing Before the Sen. 
Foreign Relations Comm., 108th Cong. 1 (2004), at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/ 
2004/VerderyTestimony040323.pdf (statement of Assistant Secretary for Border and 
Transportation Security Policy and Planning Stewart Verdery) [hereinafter Verdery Testi-
mony]. 
62 See Martin, supra note 4, at 419. 
63 See Schuck, supra note 60, at 3–4. 
64 Id. at 4. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. at 4 (noting that the 2000 elections were the ªrst in many years in which immi-
gration was not a major campaign issue). 
67 See Cassise, supra note 35, at 1378. 
68 See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, and U.S./Mexico Relations: 
The Tale of Two Treaties, 5 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 121, 139, 140 (1998). 
69 See id. at 125, 140; Martin, supra note 4, at 419. 
362 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 28:353 
way to help stem Mexican migration and illegal immigration across the 
border.70 Proponents of NAFTA claimed the treaty represented the na-
tion’s long-run solution to illegal immigration; however, the President’s 
proposal is evidence that more is needed to achieve that goal.71
II. The Varied Impact of Immigration 
 Though NAFTA does not explicitly address illegal immigration, 
the INS Commissioner, Doris M. Messinger, testiªed at Congressional 
hearings that, in all likelihood, NAFTA should result in the long-term 
reduction of illegal immigration into the United States.72 At the same 
time, President Bush’s proposal seeks to further the goals of increas-
ing national security and reducing illegal immigration through the 
use and expansion of the temporary worker program.73 However, 
while temporary workers would provide economic beneªts for em-
ployers and the U.S. economy, there are a number of negative exter-
nalities that may result from their legally residing and working in the 
United States.74 First, even with a reduction in numbers of illegal im-
migrants, the economic and social costs of immigrants on natives 
reaches beyond competition for jobs.75 Second, and perhaps more 
important, the experience of guest and temporary worker programs 
throughout the world has led to the saying, “[t]here is nothing more 
permanent than temporary workers.”76 This section explores some of 
the general economic and social costs immigrants have on the U.S. 
economy, and discusses the practical results which accompany a policy 
based on “temporary” workers. 
A. Economic and Social Costs of Immigrant Labor on Native Workers 
 The most direct way immigrants affect the U.S. economy is 
through the labor market.77 Immigration restrictions allow domestic 
laborers to demand a higher price for their services because of the 
limited supply of laborers.78 Economists argue that this restriction 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Ostry, supra note 11, at 27; Bush Announcement, supra note 5, at 34. 
71 See Johnson, supra note 25, at 941. 
72 Joe, supra note 8, at 423 (citing 70 Interpreter Releases 1546, 1547 (1993)). 
73 See Fox Endorsement, supra note 43, at 81. 
74 See Chang, supra note 2, at 378–84. 
75 See id. 
76 Martin, supra note 4, at 437. 
77 See Schuck, supra note 60, at 3–4. To what degree that effect is felt by individual 
workers remains a heated issue of debate between analysts. See id. 
78 See Chang, supra note 2, at 379–80. 
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creates economic inefªciency.79 The argument is that protectionism 
of domestic laborers causes distortions in domestic production and 
consumption due to higher production costs, and ultimately U.S. con-
sumers lose due to the resulting higher cost of goods and an 
inefªcient market.80 On an international level, standard trade theory 
calls for the same analysis and, further, is centered on the assertion 
that free trade in goods, services, and labor is needed to maximize 
national and international economic welfare and efªciency.81
 One issue surrounding a change in the U.S. laws is whether the 
beneªts from temporary labor, with respect to economic efªciency, 
outweigh the possible economic and social costs.82 The President’s 
plan implicitly assumes that the temporary workers would be substi-
tutes for U.S. workers, suggesting they would demand and be offered 
the same wage rate.83 In contrast, economic theory on free movement 
of labor would call for an adjustment in wages to create the optimal 
and efªcient distribution and use of foreign labor.84 This creates two 
possible outcomes.85 In the ªrst, employers maintain their wage rates 
and treat the availability of temporary workers as perfect substitutes 
for U.S. workers without accounting for the fact that most foreign 
workers would accept a lower wage rate for the same work.86
 The second outcome theorizes that employers would adjust their 
wage rate so that they pay the lowest wage possible while still main-
taining a full labor force.87 As a result, general wage rates would de-
crease, thereby causing U.S. workers to be unwilling to ªll jobs they 
currently occupied, and allowing for more openings for “willing for-
eign workers.”88 Theoretically, the U.S. economy as a whole would 
“beneªt from the honest labor of foreign workers” because the mar-
                                                                                                                      
79 See id. at 379. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. at 379. 
82 See id. at 378–84. 
83 See Bush Announcement, supra note 5, at 33–34. 
84 See Chang, supra note 2, at 373. 
85 See generally Edward Funkhouser & Stephen J. Trejo, The Labor Market Skills of Recent 
Male Immigrants: Evidence from the Current Population Survey, 48 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 792, 
802–06 (1995) (discussing the differences in wage rates between immigrant and native 
workers). 
86 Cf. id. at 802 (ªnding that there remains an immigrant-native wage differential even 
when controlling data for education and potential labor market experience are consid-
ered). 
87 See id. (ªnding that immigrants earned about thirty percent less than native workers 
at the end of the 1980s for the same jobs). 
88 Fox Endorsement, supra note 43, at 81; see Minehan, supra note 14. 
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ket would be more efªcient, however, the result would be more un-
employed U.S. workers due to the fact that some would be replaced 
by foreigners demanding a lower wage rate.89
 The increase in labor mobility with temporary workers, while 
economically beneªcial, creates a number of social problems for U.S. 
citizens.90 Directly, temporary workers create a loss of U.S. jobs and an 
increased dependence on foreign workers by U.S. producers.91 Immi-
grants, especially those with legal status, can gain access to, and there-
fore, increase the burden on, a number of government programs and 
public goods such as public schools, health care, and roads.92 Due to 
increased usage of a ªnite amount of services, all U.S. citizens are po-
tentially subject to the effects of higher levels of immigrants, not just 
those competing with immigrants for jobs.93 Finally, while many im-
migrants pay taxes, the net ªscal burden of unskilled immigrants on 
the United States is, and would continue to be, negative because the 
consumption of public goods and government services is much 
greater than the taxes paid by the individuals.94 Indeed, a recent re-
port by the Center for Immigration Studies found that the lifetime 
ªscal effect on the U.S. economy of the average low-skilled immigrant 
worker is a negative $55,200.95
 Additionally, Hispanics (particularly Mexican-Americans) make 
up an already large and rapidly increasing part of the electorate in the 
United States96, and therefore, can have a profound effect on the po-
litical process.97 Because of the large bloc of Hispanic voters in some 
regions, it is difªcult for elected ofªcials to go on record as opposing 
immigration reform.98 The President’s proposal is an example of how 
immigrant communities can affect the campaigns and decisions of 
candidates and incumbents.99 This is highlighted by the fact that, 
even though President Bush talked about immigration reform since 
early in his ªrst term, he mentioned it infrequently during his 2004 
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re-election campaign; indeed, even at those times when the issue was 
mentioned during the campaign, it was in Southwestern border states 
or before Hispanic audiences where it was believed it could give the 
President a political boost.100
 The President’s proposed temporary worker program would do 
nothing to improve or alter the inherent social costs of immigrants on 
the U.S. economy.101 Despite the added tax revenue, the temporary 
workers would continue to equate to negative ªscal burdens, as op-
posed to possible long term ªscal gains from those immigrant families 
who remain in the United States for generations.102 The National Re-
search Council found that the descendents of current immigrants in 
the United States are likely to have an overall net positive ªscal effect 
on the economy.103 With respect to temporary workers, there is no 
hope of the families of the immigrants reversing the negative ªscal 
effects because the workers are expected to return home perma-
nently; therefore, there is no chance for recovering any of the net so-
cial and ªscal loss the economy suffers during their time in the 
United States.104
B. Permanent Temporary Workers 
 The purpose and theory behind temporary worker programs 
such as the President’s is to add workers to the labor force without 
adding permanent residents to the population.105 Virtually all guest 
worker programs fail, though, when measured against this goal, be-
cause employers become dependent on foreign workers, and many 
workers ªnd ways to settle permanently in the host country.106 The 
President’s plan would call for the registration of the eight to twelve 
million illegal aliens currently residing in the United States, about 
three-ªfths of whom are Mexicans.107 Many of these illegal immigrants 
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remain in the country because of the dangers involved with a possible 
future return if they attempt to leave due to enhanced border protec-
tion.108 Migration of people into the United States may be more per-
manent than the legal ºow of trade, and, because of enforcement 
problems, those immigrants often remain in the country and have a 
lasting impact on the nation as discussed above.109 Additionally, the 
phenomenon is due in part to the host employers’ increasing de-
pendence on both foreign workers and foreign labor markets.110
 President Bush described the situation faced by many immi-
grants, especially illegal immigrant workers in the United States, as 
“wrong” and claimed that the changes to immigration law he pro-
posed must be made to show the compassion and the heart of the 
American people, consistent with the ideals of common sense and 
fairness with respect to immigrant workers.111 In addition to empha-
sizing the compassion of the American people, the President voiced 
his disapproval of an amnesty process which would guarantee those 
same workers the full protection and access to the laws within the U.S. 
labor market, insisting that amnesty instead encourages violation of 
U.S. laws.112 At the same time, allowing the use of temporary immi-
grant laborers creates a dependence on those workers by U.S. em-
ployers, but fails to detail what types of protections must be guaran-
teed to such workers and how those protections will be enforced.113 In 
essence, the program can be seen to serve the needs of large corpora-
tions while creating a “new kind of second-tier worker.”114
 The issue many undocumented aliens or foreign citizens may 
have to deal with, when evaluating the temporary worker programs, is 
the conºict between enrolling in a program which would ultimately 
force them to leave the country when, if they did not enroll, they 
could continue to work illegally and indeªnitely.115 Many illegal aliens 
currently residing and working in the United States have already de-
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veloped deep social and economic roots in their communities, and a 
program that allows only temporary status is not likely to provide 
sufªcient inducement for them to come forward and register.116 Addi-
tionally, without strict supervision of the program, those workers en-
tering from abroad may be unwilling to return voluntarily to their 
home countries, and instead may choose to use their temporary 
worker status as a means toward establishing themselves permanently 
in the United States.117
III. The Need to Approach Immigration Reforms Through NAFTA 
 During the ratiªcation process, the debate about immigration 
under NAFTA was based primarily on the issue of fear of migration of 
jobs to Mexico and illegal immigration from Mexico.118 The Presi-
dent’s plan allows for employers to ªll jobs that U.S. citizens are un-
willing to take by opening the border to temporary workers at a time 
when there are eight to twelve million unemployed citizens, as well as 
eight to twelve million illegal aliens in the United States.119 It seems 
plausible that the reason that many available jobs are not being ªlled 
does not have to do with a lack of unemployed U.S. citizens, but 
rather with the conditions and circumstances of employment, and the 
amount of money the employer is willing to pay.120 The unilateral 
amendment of immigration laws by the United States to allow for 
temporary foreign workers, especially from Mexico, allows for tempo-
rary workers to have a type of dual citizenship, while no rights or 
beneªts would be reciprocated to U.S. workers in foreign countries.121 
This section argues that the current debate should shift to the core 
issue of negotiating NAFTA provisions governing the movement of all 
types of labor, not just professionals, between the United States, Can-
ada, and Mexico, rather than the inherent ºaws in a unilateral law 
and policy change by the United States. 
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A. Unilateral Change Without Direct Domestic Beneªts 
 The President’s plan, while supported and endorsed by President 
Vicente Fox of Mexico, is a one-sided and unilateral change to the 
United States’ immigration laws.122 The majority of the direct beneªts 
of this change will not be felt by U.S. citizens; instead, they will go to 
the hundreds of thousands of illegal and potential immigrants who 
would become part of the program.123 The President has claimed that 
the change would help increase national security, as well as create a 
speculative economic boost.124 In overall ªscal terms, there may be no 
measurable beneªt to the United States, but merely the assertion that 
the United States is safer because of an increase in border control and 
greater monitoring of foreigners entering the country.125
 The need for a multilateral, as opposed to unilateral, change to 
immigration laws within North America can be explained and empha-
sized through both an economic and social analysis of President 
Bush’s plan.126 However, because of the advanced nature of the 
economies of the United States and Canada, when compared with the 
developing economy of Mexico, completely unrestricted movement of 
labor between members of NAFTA is not currently feasible.127 A mul-
tilateral plan which reduces the restrictions on the movement of labor 
would directly increase economic efªciency and positively affect each 
individual nation.128 At the same time, restructuring of immigration 
and labor laws to allow for unlimited temporary labor on a unilateral 
level maintains, if not heightens, economic inefªciency and social 
problems created by legal and illegal immigration.129
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 The President’s temporary worker program, in theory, would en-
tice the registration of illegal immigrants through a promise of tem-
porary legal status.130 Upon registration, the immigrants would pay a 
fee and register their names and addresses, so that after their legal 
status expires the government can identify them and return them to 
their home country.131 The President’s plan asks for illegal immi-
grants to register themselves with the knowledge that, three years 
from that date, the INS would notify them that their legal status has 
expired and they must leave the country, but, if the immigrants did 
nothing, they could maintain their status quo indeªnitely.132 The plan 
assumes that illegal immigrants would weigh the advantage of the abil-
ity to travel between the United States and their home country with 
the three year expiration date on their residence in the United States, 
and ªnd obtaining legal status worth restricting their time in the 
country.133 As a further deterrent, many immigrants may fear that reg-
istration could be used against them in other detrimental ways.134 
Economically, the United States would be instituting an implicit time 
limit on existing sources of labor within its economy, not just attract-
ing temporary labor.135 Those foreign workers who would enter the 
United States through the temporary worker program would also face 
the three year deadline, but the expiration of their status could have 
less of a direct economic effect in reduction of current labor levels 
because of the circularity of the workers.136
 For each temporary laborer sent home, there would be an im-
plicit economic loss in human capital.137 The President cites as sup-
port for his proposal the fact that, after their time in the United 
States, workers would return to their home countries with additional 
skills and training which would aid their home economy.138 Such skills 
and training would be learned at the expense of, and through train-
ing by, U.S. companies.139 While U.S. companies would be able to get 
workers through the program, they would also lose those workers in 
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whom they had invested time, money, and training.140 Pursuant to an 
economic analysis, it stands to reason that companies would be reluc-
tant to train temporary workers past the lowest necessary level be-
cause any investment in the worker would only beneªt the company 
for three years.141 By asking U.S. companies to comply with a three 
year program, the President would implicitly be limiting the amount 
of training and on-the-job education that temporary workers would be 
given, and with which they would return home.142 This resulting limit 
on training undermines the assertion that returning workers would 
have a great impact on their home economy.143
 Additionally, if labor laws were not vigorously enforced, the ªnite 
term of possible employment would expose temporary workers to 
negative, and possibly illegal, treatment by employers.144 There may 
be companies which would seek to exploit temporary workers by 
maintaining the lowest possible wage rates, restricting promotions, 
and instituting programs which use the ªxed time frame as a major 
factor against temporary workers.145 Economically, companies face 
much higher costs if there is turnover in more advanced positions 
ªlled by temporary workers because of higher levels of training and 
investment in human capital.146 It is very possible that, under the 
Bush plan, temporary workers would be subject to implicit and struc-
tural employment discrimination because of their legally deªned pe-
riod of employment.147
 Furthermore, under the plan, a temporary worker must hold and 
maintain employment to retain legal status, and some employers may 
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use this unstable legal status to exploit workers.148 While probably il-
legal, it is not impossible to imagine scenarios where temporary work-
ers might seek to exercise their rights by seeking to join unions, re-
questing raises, or pursuing other beneªts, and an employer would 
threaten termination of employment, and thus legal status, to stiºe 
such actions.149 Overall, the temporary worker program potentially 
would leave foreign workers in an extremely weak bargaining posi-
tion.150
B. Recent Events and Multilateral Negotiation 
 In March 2004, President Bush acknowledged that his proposal 
faced a tough time in Congress.151 Over two months after the an-
nouncement of his proposal, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
held a hearing on the issue of United States-Mexico relations, but no 
language had been drafted regarding the President’s proposal.152 Af-
ter the hearings, the Republican-controlled Congress did nothing fur-
ther to move on the President’s proposal in 2004.153 Despite the lack 
of progress for the President’s plan, the debate about immigration 
reform came to the political forefront that spring.154 The meeting be-
tween President Bush and President Fox in early March 2004 empha-
sized the Bush Administration’s focus on protecting the nation from 
terrorism through stemming the ºow of illegal immigrants.155 During 
the second meeting of the two leaders in November 2004, President 
Bush renewed his support for his plan and changes to U.S. immigra-
tion law, but did not pledge to push for the enactment of his pro-
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posal.156 The meetings between the two leaders could have been ideal 
moments to re-open discussions about regional, instead of merely uni-
lateral, immigration and/or labor agreements between, not just the 
United States and Mexico, but all of the members of NAFTA.157
 Canadian support and approval would be necessary to add the 
ªnal aspect of free trade (movement of labor) to the NAFTA agree-
ment.158 Realistically, obtaining Canadian support for a multilateral 
plan likely would not be a major hurdle to a region-wide agreement.159 
The immigration standards between the United States and Canada 
maintain a level of freedom which would not need major amendments 
in order to facilitate negotiations to add labor to NAFTA.160 Canada’s 
interest in expanded movement of labor is the attraction of human 
capital and talent into their economy, a goal which would be furthered 
through a region-wide agreement.161 From Canada’s perspective, 
NAFTA began a period of increased continental integration which 
could, in the future, include freer (but not unrestricted) movement of, 
not only goods, capital, and ideas, but also people.162
C. Negotiation Through NAFTA 
 The proposed temporary worker program essentially would have 
the effect of opening the U.S. job market to any foreign worker will-
ing to ªll a job at a wage that a native worker would be unwilling to 
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accept.163 The Bush Administration has emphasized that a principal 
target of the program is Mexico and illegal Mexican immigrants.164 
The temporary worker program would provide an unlimited amount 
of Mexicans with the legal right to work and live in the United States, 
without any reciprocal rights for U.S. citizens within Mexico.165 
Hence, the overall effect is a unilateral opening of the United States’ 
borders for the primary beneªt of another NAFTA member nation, 
without provisions allowing for the protections that could be gained 
through an international agreement.166
 If President Bush’s main focus is to control and deter illegal im-
migration from Mexico through an amendment to immigration pol-
icy, there is no reason to open the United States’ borders to all coun-
tries.167 When NAFTA was negotiated, labor was left off of the 
bargaining table mainly because of the United States’ fear of Mexican 
immigrants.168 As it currently stands, NAFTA reinforces the immigra-
tion status quo between the United States and Mexico while economic 
and other pressures favor change.169 In March and November 2004, 
Presidents Bush and Fox met to discuss the temporary worker pro-
gram, and both were supportive of advancing the policy of movement 
of labor between the United States and Mexico, adding to the pres-
sures favoring change.170 With the primary obstacle to negotiating 
labor within the original NAFTA debates (namely, U.S. opposition to 
Mexican workers) now open to negotiation and discussion, the ap-
propriate forum for those negotiations is within the framework of 
NAFTA.171 By negotiating within NAFTA, the member nations would 
be able to ensure that any amendments to labor and immigration law 
and policies would fully “protect, enhance, and enforce workers’ 
rights” in all member nations, and therefore, further the standards 
established in the original negotiations.172
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 An amendment to NAFTA would not have to establish a uniform 
approach to standards for permanent legal status for immigrants 
within the three member nations, but it should set out a minimum 
accepted level of treatment for applicants from within NAFTA.173 
Without the possibility of permanent legal status, even a multinational 
worker movement policy would be susceptible to those who seek to 
avoid control by moving through illegal channels.174 However, each 
country within NAFTA faces different immigration issues from the 
rest of the world and is, and must continue to be, afforded the oppor-
tunity and ability to set its own immigration policy and laws.175
 NAFTA’s Preamble establishes the standard for workers’ rights, 
but currently that promise is not supported in the actual language of 
the treaty.176 Freer movement of labor across borders is an underlying 
economic necessity to further enhance and maximize the efªciency of 
member nations’ economies.177 However, completely free movement 
of labor between the member nations, such as is the case in the Euro-
pean Union, is not feasible because of the economic, social, and po-
litical differences of Mexico compared to the other two NAFTA mem-
ber countries.178 A unilateral legal change by the United States to 
allow for Mexican temporary workers would do little, if nothing, to 
improve that economic differential.179 A multilateral agreement to 
allow for controlled, but expanded, movement of workers between 
member nations would allow for economic growth and higher levels 
                                                                                                                      
173 See Ellen G. Yost, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Chapter Sixteen, “Temporary 
Entry for Business Persons,” A United States Perspective, in The North American Free Trade 
Agreement: A New Frontier in International Trade and Investment in the Ameri-
cas 247, 248, 259 ( Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1994) (discussing the ability of NAFTA Chap-
ter 16 to allow for temporary entry of business persons on a reciprocal basis while recog-
nizing the need to ensure border security and protect the domestic labor force and 
permanent employment). 
174 See O’Meara, supra note 57, at 31. 
175 See NAFTA, supra note 15, ch. 16, art. 1607. 
176 NAFTA, supra note 15, pmbl.; Stanley M. Spracker & Gregory M. Brown, Labor Issues 
Under the NAFTA: Options and Resolutions, in The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment: A New Frontier in International Trade and Investment in the Americas 351, 
351 ( Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1994). 
177 See Chang, supra note 2, at 373. 
178 See O’Meara, supra note 57, at 32. 
179 See U.S. & Mexico: Immigration Policy & The Bilateral Relationship: Hearing Before the 
Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., 108th Cong. 9 (2004), at http://foreign.senate.gov/testi 
mony/2004/ValenzuelaTestimony040323.pdf (statement of Arturo Valenzuela, Professor 
of Government and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the Edmund A. 
Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University). 
2005] Regionalizing Labor Policy Through NAFTA 375 
of economic efªciency in each country.180 Lower skilled laborers from 
Mexico could ªll jobs in the United States and/or Canada, while 
higher skilled and trained workers could enter Mexico and, theoreti-
cally, work to improve and strengthen the Mexican job market and 
therefore the Mexican economy.181
 During the original debates over NAFTA, the need for freer 
movement of foreign investment, capital, and services between mem-
bers was agreed upon, but the ªnal economic factor (labor) was left 
unaccounted for in the text.182 By negotiating to add the ªnal eco-
nomic factor to the equation, the United States’ goals of developing 
and furthering the economic stability of Mexico and increasing na-
tional security would be more complete.183 Moreover, amending 
NAFTA to include a provision on immigration and labor would not 
need to undermine each individual country’s immigration laws and 
policies with respect to outside nations.184 Chapter 16 of NAFTA cur-
rently provides for freer movement of business persons between the 
member nations, while still allowing each individual nation to set its 
immigration standards for business persons from abroad; the same type 
of provision could be negotiated for low and un-skilled laborers.185 Fur-
thermore, if there was a region-wide agreement on border enforce-
ment and policy, the security of each member nation would increase 
substantially more than would occur with a unilateral increase in pro-
tection, simply because of the heightened degree of regional coopera-
tion and coordination in immigration and anti-terrorist practices.186
 A regional labor movement policy would also eliminate the 
“opening of the ºoodgates” feel of a nationality-neutral, unilateral 
temporary worker program.187 To address the primary issue of illegal 
Mexican immigrants, the President’s plan would unnecessarily open 
the United States’ borders to temporary workers from all nations.188 
                                                                                                                      
180 See Chang, supra note 2, at 373. 
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In contrast, creating a movement of labor provision in NAFTA would 
address the speciªc issue of Mexican workers, while allowing for the 
member nations to maintain domestic immigration laws to meet the 
needs and policies relating to immigrants from non-member na-
tions.189 A labor and/or immigration provision in NAFTA would 
ªnally bring the last economic factor of production190 entirely within 
the provisions of the treaty, as well as further the goals of national se-
curity and border control.191
Conclusion 
 NAFTA was a groundbreaking agreement with respect to the 
cross-border trade in services. An amendment to NAFTA dealing with 
controlled regional movement of labor could be equally ground-
breaking, allowing for more efªcient uses of labor while not requiring 
a comprehensive integration of economies and social policies. The 
beneªts of working on a regional level, as opposed to unilateral action 
by the United States, would be felt most directly by U.S. workers. In 
order to create a higher level of economic efªciency without destroy-
ing the U.S. labor market, the agreement would need to include pro-
visions to restructure the ability of workers to move between all mem-
ber nations without removing all restrictions. With a regional policy 
and agreement, the U.S. economy would be less exposed to potential 
economic losses caused by immigrants than it would with unilateral 
action. The skills and training of immigrant workers would not suffer 
limitations due to a ªnite expiration date, and at the same time for-
eign workers would be less likely to encounter exploitation and dis-
criminatory treatment in the workplace. Additionally, legal immigrant 
laborers would add to the tax base of the host country, resulting in 
increased tax revenue. Finally, national security would increase be-
cause of decreased need for enforcement coupled with increased 
multilateral efforts to control illegal border crossings. 
 The issues that surrounded the original NAFTA debates about 
labor and economic standards within Mexico would undoubtedly 
arise during debates over a regional labor movement policy. It is 
probable that the admittance of U.S. workers to the Mexican labor 
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force, especially in management positions, would have a much more 
direct and immediate impact on Mexican labor, environmental poli-
cies, and the economy, than the current indirect effect of improve-
ment of policies with the gradual improvement of the Mexican econ-
omy. A direct negotiation between member countries for regional 
immigration and labor provisions would likely lead to faster and bet-
ter results than would be possible through a unilateral action by any 
member. The goals of improving national security for each member 
nation and enhancing regional economic stability are more likely to 
be implemented successfully if there is regional cooperation within 
NAFTA. 
